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The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution both prohibits the 
establishment of religion and guarantees its free exercise.  There is, however, 
a tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause,
which has been understood to erect a “wall of separation” between church
and state.1  Prima facie, the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from 
providing special benefits to institutions or individuals in virtue of their 
religious affiliations or convictions. The Free Exercise Clause, however,
is cited in support of accommodations for individuals who, because of
their religious commitments, cannot in good conscience conform to laws 
or regulations.  This seems to breach the wall of separation: arguably, to 
the extent that the state provides special accommodations to individuals
in virtue of their religious beliefs, it tacitly endorses them.
I suggest, first, that we can square the wall-of-separation doctrine with 
the Free Exercise Clause if we understand religion in the minimalist 
sense—according to which religious freedom is nothing more than a license 
to hold beliefs about supernatural beings and states of affairs and to
* © 2016 H.E. Baber.  Professor of Philosophy, University of San Diego. 
1.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
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participate in religious rituals that are harmless and therefore not subject
to legal restrictions. Secondly, I note that even if, as I suggest, we reject
conscience per se, whether religiously informed or not, as a reason for
special accommodations, we can still support exemptions from some legal 
obligations and prohibitions for conscientious individuals on the grounds 
that, for them, compliance would impose an undue burden: conscience 
clauses, I suggest, may be understood to be a special case of hardship
exemptions.  Finally, and perhaps most controversially, I argue that public 
support for religious displays and ceremonies does not violate separation
of church and state.
I. RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF RELIGION
Since 1913, a cross has stood atop Mount Soledad in La Jolla, California.
The current Mount Soledad cross, erected in 1954, is a remarkably ugly 
29-foot-tall concrete structure with a 12-foot wingspan.  Since 1989, litigation
surrounding the cross has been ongoing.2  Opponents argued that its presence
on public land violated the separation of church and state mandated by the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  In addition they
argued that it violated the No Preference Clause of the California Constitution, 
insofar as it demonstrated a preference for a specific religion—Christianity.3 
In June, 2012, after over two decades of continuous litigation, the United
States Supreme Court declined to hear the case of the Mount Soledad cross.4 
As a consequence, the 2011 decision of the United States Court of Appeals 
of the Ninth Circuit, which ruled the location of the cross to be 
unconstitutional, stands.5 
The ruling against the presence of the cross on public land represents a 
special restriction on the display of religious symbols.  If the structure on
the summit of Mount Soledad had been an abstract sculpture of equal size, 
visibility, and aesthetic deficiency, there would have been no contest.  The 
objection to the Mount Soledad cross came solely from the fact that it was 
a religious symbol and, in particular, that it was a Christian symbol. 
In its ruling, the Court suggested that the presence of the cross on Mount 
Soledad had undesirable symbolic value and social consequences: 
2. Randal C. Archibold, High on a Hill Above San Diego, a Church-State Fight 
Plays Out, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/01/us/high-on-a­
hill-above-san-diego-a-churchstate-fight-plays-out.html [https://perma.cc/Y8S6-UQ6X]. 
3. See Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1427 (S.D. Cal. 1991). 
4. Doug Berger, US Supreme Court Refuses To Hear Appeal in Mt Soledad Cross 
Case, SECULAR LEFT (June 25, 2012), http://www.secularleft.us/archives/2012/06/us-
supreme-court-refuses-to-hear-appeal-in-mt-soledad-cross-case.html#.U57mZagWfrh
[https://perma.cc/VJU8-AE7B]. 
5.  Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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La Jolla—where the Memorial is located and serves as a prominent landmark —
has a history of anti-Semitism that reinforces the Memorial’s sectarian effect.
. . . .
The use of such a distinctively Christian symbol to honor all veterans sends a 
strong message of endorsement and exclusion.  It suggests that the government is
so connected to a particular religion that it treats that religion’s symbolism as its
own, as universal.  To many non-Christian veterans, this claim of universality is
alienating.6 
Indeed, in 2006 the American Civil Liberties Union representing the
Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America filed a lawsuit against 
the U.S. government, charging that the continued display of the Mt. 
Soledad cross on federally owned land unlawfully entangled government 
with religion and asked the Court to remove it.7  Defenders of the Faith 
sought to have the Mount Soledad cross, which had served as the venue 
for pan-Protestant Easter sunrise services, recognized as a war memorial 
in order to circumvent regulations concerning the display of religious
symbols on public land.8  In this they were hoist  by their own petards.  It
is not hard to understand the Jewish War Veterans’ objections: the use of 
the cross as a war memorial suggested that veterans were largely, or
exclusively, Christian, that patriotism was a Christian enterprise, and by 
extension, that non-Christians could not be true patriots.9  Representing 
6. Id. at 1121, 1124–25. 
7. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Represents Jewish War Veterans and San Diego
Residents in Effort To Relocate Mt. Soledad Memorial (Aug. 24, 2006), https://www.
aclu.org/religion-belief/aclu-represents-jewish-war-veterans-and-san-diego-residents­
effort-relocate-mt [https://perma.cc/XF8J-NY2A].
8. See Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1437. 
9. To understand the worry, we recall an episode from the 1960s, in which the city
fathers of Wayne, New Jersey became embroiled in charges of “gray area” anti-Semitism.
In preparation for a Fourth of July celebration, civic groups drew lots for the Revolutionary
War hero they were to represent.  In addition to the usual suspects, there was the joker:
Benedict Arnold who, before going over to the Dark Side, had fought with distinction for 
the Revolution and been wounded.  The civic organization that drew the Benedict Arnold 
card was supposed to support its patron as a jolly joke. Arnold did, after all, lose a leg fighting 
for the American side, and the Boot Monument in Saratoga New York’s National Historical
Park features a high relief of his leg to commemorate his achievement. 
As it happened, the Benedict Arnold card was drawn by a local Jewish group.  And the 
city fathers, in embarrassment, immediately apologized and withdrew it—revealing that 
they tacitly assumed Jewish Americans’ patriotism was in question and that Jews were not 
quite proper Americans. Mr. Rauf: Build That Mosque!, THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT
(Sept. 1, 2010, 1:53 PM), http://theenlightenmentproject.blogspot.com/2010/09/mr.html
[https://perma.cc/S7RB-U9D5].
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the cross as a war memorial sent a message of exclusion to non-Christian
veterans in a way that the mere presence of the cross qua cross would not 
have done.
Serious secularists’ objections to religious symbols in public space have 
not, however, been grounded in worries about the hegemony of religious 
majorities: secularists have been equally hostile to traditionally oppressed
religious minorities.  So the Freedom from Religion Foundation objected 
to a design for the Ohio Statehouse Holocaust memorial incorporating a 
Star of David, on the grounds that it would violate separation of church 
and state.10  Supporters of the memorial argued that, within the proposed 
context, a six-pointed star was not religious. It was a symbol of an ethnic 
group—and in fact the symbol that Hitler’s government required ethnically
identified Jews to display visibly on their persons.11  Like the Mount
Soledad Cross devotees who claimed the cross was a war memorial, their
aim was to detoxify the symbolic shape by making the case that it was not
inherently religious.  Opponents challenged the inclusion of a six-pointed
star in the statehouse’s Holocaust memorial on the grounds that it would 
ordinarily be construed as a religious symbol;12 defenders argued that 
within the context of the memorial it had secular significance.13  Both sides, 
however, agreed that the sole concern about the inclusion of the star was 
its putative religious significance. Here, once again, the question was not 
whether religion should be accorded a privileged status, but whether special 
restrictions should be imposed on religious expression. 
Perhaps the clearest case of special restrictions on religious practice
concerns the rental of space in public schools by religious groups. 
Throughout the U.S., public schools rent their facilities for weekend use 
to local organizations, including religious groups.  The Freedom from 
Religion Foundation, a Madison, Wisconsin–based secularist organization, 
notes that this is legal but nevertheless objects to the benefit it provides to
religious groups: 
Unfortunately, two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court provide for the use of
public school buildings by churches [and] religious and political groups on a 
viewpoint-neutral basis . . . .  The subsidy involved in use of public schools by
10. Press Release, Freedom from Religion Found., FFRF Objects to Religious Symbol 
at Ohio Capitol (July 18, 2013), http://ffrf.org/news/news-releases/item/18172-ffrf-objects-to­
religious-symbol-at-ohio-capitol [https://perma.cc/A9SV-LFDR].
11. See Alan Johnson, Freedom from Religion Foundation Objects to Star of David
in Holocaust Memorial, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 17, 2013, 11:32 AM), http://www. 
dispatch.com/content/blogs/the-daily-briefing/2013/07/07-17-13-freedom-from-religion.html
[https://perma.cc/HY3N-6J9X].
12. See Press Release, Freedom from Religion Found., supra note 10. 
13. See Johnson, supra note 11. 
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religious organizations, however, continues to create concern, confusion, and
litigation.  The law on the limits of church use is not completely settled. . . .
Since public school districts often have the least expensive rental rates available
in a community, rental to churches often involves what many of us consider
taxpayer subsidy of congregations.  Start-up churches often take advantage of low
school rental to establish themselves.  They obtain a prominent site for a new
church, collect church donations on public property, and use their savings to
eventually buy their own tax-free buildings.14 
The Freedom from Religion Foundation regards it as unfortunate that 
the Supreme Court recognizes the right of religious groups to be treated on a
par with secular organizations but notes, hopefully, that public facilities 
may impose restrictions on the kinds of activities in which renters may
engage and may, in particular, prohibit them from conducting worship
services.
While schools are not permitted to discriminate against religious groups
because they are religious, schools can create regulations that impact
church use of school buildings . . . .  One appellate court, the 2nd Circuit, 
ruled in 2011 that a school board’s prohibition of hosting a particular type
of activity, religious worship services, was constitutional.15 
While the Freedom from Religion Foundation and other secularist 
groups apparently have no worry about hobbyists meeting in schools to
discuss stamp-collecting or couples meeting to practice Lamaze breathing
in prenatal classes, they are adamant that religious services should be
prohibited.16  Why?
 14. State/Church FAQ: Churches Meeting at Public Schools, FREEDOM FROM
RELIGION FOUND., http://ffrf.org/faq/state-church/item/14033-churches-meeting-at-public­
schools [https://perma.cc/RHV2-3FVE] (last updated Jan. 2012); see also Supreme Court 
Skips N.Y. Battle over Church Rental of Public School, AMERICANS UNITED FOR 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH & ST. (Jan. 2012), https://www.au.org/church-state/january­
2012-church-state/people-events/supreme-court-skips-ny-battle-over-church [https://perma.
cc/3NH4-MJFT] (discussing the Court’s decision not to hear a church’s appeal from the
Second Circuit’s decision upholding a New York City policy prohibiting churches form
holding services in public schools during off hours). 
15. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., supra note 14 (citing Bronx Household of 
Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also AMERICANS UNITED FOR
SEPARATION OF CHURCH & ST., supra note 14 (noting that while religious worship is not 
permitted, religious groups could still use schools for “lectures, meetings[,] and other
events on religious topics”).
16. See FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., supra note 14; AMERICANS UNITED FOR
SEPARATION OF CHURCH & ST., supra note 14. 
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It has been traditional to cite the “wall of separation between church and 
state” espoused by Jefferson and built into the United States Constitution 
in such cases.17  But the wall of separation, as it has existed in the U.S., is
at best permeable.  Churches are routinely granted tax-exempt status, and 
clergy are given tax-free housing allowances18—which, in good times, 
facilitate lucrative real estate speculation by clerics.19 In addition, religious
belief and affiliation can be invoked in support of conscientious-objector 
status for military service and for exemption from other duties.20  At the
same time, increasingly restrictions have been imposed on the presence of
religious symbols and ceremonies in public spaces.21 
The general public is puzzled.  La Jolla-area residents wonder why the
Mount Soledad cross is a problem. The Ohio statehouse controversy is even
more puzzling to most observers.  Why should the Star of David in a 
Holocaust memorial offend anyone?  As for the use of school facilities 
why, they wonder, should anyone care whether religious groups meeting
in schools conduct religious services if they pay their rent like everyone 
else and don’t leave a mess?  Even if providing the use of facilities at
reasonable rates could be construed as subsidizing the activities of renters,
why should taxpayers be more concerned about subsidizing religious rituals
than they would be about subsidizing stamp collecting or Lamaze?
The separation of church and state doctrine mandates that religion
should not get special treatment by the state.  Yet, considering these cases, 
we see that a variety of religious activities are subject to special restrictions
for no reason other than that they are religious.  What is the problem with
religion? 
17. The locus classicus is Thomas Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1994). 
18. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 1828, 501(c)(3): TAX GUIDE FOR
CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2, 22 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.
pdf [https://perma.cc/FDG9-4CG9]. 
19. See Press Release, Freedom from Religion Found., Major Federal Court
Victory!: FFRF, Gaylor, Barker Overturn ‘Parsonage Exemption’ Clergy Privilege (Nov.
22, 2013), http://ffrf.org/news/news-releases/item/19361-ffrf-gaylor-barker-overturn-%E2%
80%98parsonage-exemption%E2%80%99-clergy-privilege [https://perma.cc/EXJ3-5295].
20. See Who Is a Military Conscientious Objector?, CTR. ON CONSCIENCE & WAR
(last visited Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.centeronconscience.org/co/military.html [https://perma.
cc/J2C9-NBKN].
21. Keith Gunnar Bentele et al., Breaking Down the Wall between Church and 
State: State Adoption of Religious Inclusion Legislation, 1995–2009, 56 J. CHURCH & ST. 
503, 503–04 (2014). 
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II. IT DEPENDS WHAT YOU MEAN BY RELIGION
Religion, as the folk understand it, is inconsequential.  It consists 
of metaphysical speculation, concerning the existence and nature of God,
gods, or supernatural states of affairs, and ceremonies intended to honor,
petition, or placate supernatural beings or otherwise to secure material or
supernatural benefits.  Thus Durkheim defines religion as a “unified system 
of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things . . . set apart and forbidden.”22 
Religion understood in this way is innocuous and, some suggest, trivial. 
Conservative religionists, however, claim that real religion is quite another 
thing. So in First Things, Discovery Institute fellow Wesley Smith complains 
that “freedom of worship,” constitutes an assault on “freedom of religion”: 
Freedom of religion means the right to live according to one’s own faith, that is, 
to “manifest” our religion or belief in practice, both “in public or private,” 
without interference from the state. 
. . . Strident secularism is on the march and freedom of religion is the target,
with secularist warriors attempting to drive religious practice behind closed doors 
by redefining religious liberty down to a hyper-restricted, “freedom of worship.” 
What’s the difference?  Under freedom of worship, the Catholic and Orthodox
churches both remain perfectly free to teach that the Eucharistic bread and wine
transform into the body and blood of Christ.  Muslims can continue to require 
women to be segregated from men at the mosque. But outside worship contexts, 
the state may compel the faithful to violate their faith by acting in accord with
secular morality rather than consistently with their dogmatic precepts.23 
Nevertheless, arguably, the guarantee of “freedom of religion” in the 
Constitution was motivated precisely by a definition of religion as “worship” 
in Smith’s sense—recognizing that religion understood in this minimalist 
sense was harmless.24  As Jefferson, the architect of the wall of separation 
22. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 28 n.7, 29 n.9 (2013) (citing EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 44 (Karen E. Fields trans., Free
Press 1995) (1912)).
23. Wesley J. Smith, Freedom of Worship’s Assault on Freedom of Religion, FIRST 
THINGS (July 13, 2012), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2012/07/freedom-of­
worshiprsquos-assault-on-freedom-of-religion/wesley-j-smith [https://perma.cc/4R2C­
Z7QY] (second emphasis added) (quoting G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, at 18 (Dec. 10, 1948)). 
24. My aim is not to argue that this was indeed Jefferson’s view, that the Folk 
understand religion in this minimalist sense, or that this was the Founders’ intent in 
endorsing a Constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion that should guide subsequent
legal decisions. Rather I suggest that if we understand religion in this minimalist sense,
then the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause is resolved.
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between church and state famously asserted: “it does me no injury for my
neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no God.  It neither picks my
pocket nor breaks my leg.”25 
Jefferson assumed that religion was inconsequential and would soon
evolve into an innocuous program of edification and social improvement. 
Writing at the beginning of the 19th Century, before the Evangelical 
revivals that were to come, when the triumph of the Enlightenment seemed
assured, Jefferson could be sanguine.  “I trust,” he wrote in 1822, “that there
is not a young man now living in the U[.]S. who will not die an Unitarian.”26 
Arguably, Jefferson promoted freedom of religion precisely because he
was convinced that it was harmless—because he understood religion in 
the minimalist sense as ceremony, metaphysics, and maxims concerning
common decency that did not compete with “secular morality.”
If, however, religion is indeed trivial and innocuous, it is hard to see 
why religious liberty should get special consideration in the Constitution 
and, among Constitutional Amendments, pride of place, as Brian Leiter,
considering the case for “tolerating religion,” and other legal theorists 
have noted.27  Leiter therefore rejects Durkheim’s definition of religion on
that grounds that “it would leave mysterious why such beliefs and practices
should command special moral or legal consideration.”28  So Leiter writes:
Moreover, as a matter of historical speculation, it seems reasonable to assume that this was
the view of the Founders who were, for the most part, deists and skeptics, and who did not 
anticipate the revival of Evangelical Christianity later in the 19th Century. See David L. 
Holmes, The Founding Fathers, Deism, and Christianity: Founding Fathers, ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Founding-Fathers-Deism-and-Christianity
-1272214/article-history [https://perma.cc/753L-FJVT] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
 25. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed.,
Univ. of North Carolina Press 1955) (1787). Since Jefferson’s day, academics have 
proposed a range of fanciful revisionary definitions of religion: “knowledge possessed by
the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind,” (Hegel), “the state of being grasped by an
ultimate concern,” (Tillich), and “a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the 
ultimate conditions of his existence,” (Robert Bellah).  LOUIS BERKHOF, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY
104 (combined ed. 1996) (“[Hegel] speaks of [religion] as ‘the knowledge possessed by
the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind[.]’”); PAUL TILLICH, CHRISTIANITY AND THE
ENCOUNTER OF THE WORLD RELIGIONS 4 (1963); Robert N. Bellah, Religious Evolution, 
29 AM. SOC. REV. 358, 359 (1964). 
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26, 1822) (on file 
with the National Archives), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02­
2905 [https://perma.cc/4H42-TJEC] (meaning, at least, that they would not be “a Trinitarian”). 
27. LEITER, supra note 22, at 29–30. 
28. Id. (“[W]e want to identify religion in such a way that we can see why it has
some moral and possibly legal claim on special treatment.  To that end, if the best analysis
of religion—one that identifies what makes it distinctive and suggests why it has a claim 
on toleration—requires us to forfeit some of our pretheoretical intuitions, that may be the 
cost of clear thinking about religious toleration and its parameters.”).
38
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On my proposed account, for all religions, there are at least some beliefs central 
to the religion that
1. issue in categorical demands on action—that is, demands that must be satisfied
no matter what . . . incentives or disincentives the world offers up; and
2. do not answer ultimately (or at the limit) to evidence and reasons. . . . Religious
beliefs . . . are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational
justification . . . .29 
Leiter wonders why religious liberty should get special consideration in 
the Constitution and, among Constitutional Amendments, pride of place 
if it is indeed trivial and innocuous.  Arguably, however, it is precisely
because religion is harmless but has not always been recognized as such 
that special moral and legal guarantees of religious freedom were required. 
Jefferson’s views were unorthodox and novel—a fact that we, who
assume that theology has no practical import, are inclined to overlook. 
For millennia it was taken for granted that one’s neighbor’s heterodoxy 
could do harm: that the gods, or God, punished whole communities for 
harboring members who ignored or slighted them.  Socrates’ failure to honor 
the gods properly, as his accusers saw it, jeopardized the entire polis.30 
Once Greco-Roman paganism evolved into state Christianity, belief as
well as practice became a matter of concern.  Constantine worried that 
theological controversy was displeasing to God and did everything in his 
power to promote agreement;31 Justinian took it to be an established fact 
that God punished communities that tolerated heresy with earthquakes,
plagues, famines, and other natural disasters.32  During the medieval period 
it was widely assumed that the presence of Jews, heretics, and unbelievers 
drew divine wrath down on everyone. Millenarian sects, such as those 
described by Norman Cohn in The Pursuit of the Millennium, strove to
 29. Id. at 33–34. 
30. See Plato, Apology, in 7 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 200 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1987)
(c. 360 B.C.E.). 
31. See PETER J. LEITHART, DEFENDING CONSTANTINE: THE TWILIGHT OF AN EMPIRE 
AND THE DAWN OF CHRISTENDOM 85 (2010). 
32. JAMES ALLAN EVANS, THE EMPEROR JUSTINIAN AND THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE 28
(2005). 
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“cleanse” the world of heresy and disbelief by exterminating them in order
to bring on the Kingdom of God.33 
We do not recognize the novelty of Jefferson’s suggestion that religious 
diversity and dissent are harmless because we currently take that for granted.34 
Most Americans do not believe God punishes entire communities for the 
heresies or sins of their members.  Moreover most, including most Evangelicals
as Cunningham and Putnam note in American Grace, believe that individuals
who do not share their religious views and, indeed, those who reject religious
belief altogether, can be “good Americans” and can “get to heaven.”35 
Arguably, it was because the Founders recognized that religion was
mistakenly viewed as a matter of importance that they thought it necessary
to include an explicit guarantee of religious freedom in the Constitution— 
just as it was later noted that because race and gender were mistakenly
regarded as bars to full citizenship that it was important to state explicitly 
that citizens had a right to enjoy full civil rights regardless of race or gender. 
Race, sex and, arguably, religion are mentioned explicitly in Constitutional 
amendments, and in civil rights legislation, not because they are significant, 
but in order to affirm that they are not significant. 
Recognizing the historical context in which the constitution was written, it
is easy to see why the Framers included a guarantee of religious freedom 
but did not mention freedom to engage in other harmless activities.36 
Historically, heresy was not tolerated and deviant religious practices were
routinely suppressed until very recently in human history. The British
Parliament did not pass the Act of Toleration, which granted non-Anglican
 33. See generally NORMAN COHN, THE PURSUIT OF THE MILLENNIUM: REVOLUTIONARY 
MILLENARIANS AND MYSTICAL ANARCHISTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES (rev. ed. 1970) (describing 
the acts of various millenarian sects throughout history). 
34. So, in the wake of 9/11, when Jerry Falwell opined that “the pagans, and the 
abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to
make . . . an alternative lifestyle” had “helped [the September 11th attacks] happen” Americans 
were outraged, and Falwell apologized. Falwell Apologizes to Gays, Feminists, Lesbians, 
CNN (Sept. 14, 2001, 2:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/14/Falwell.apology/
[https://perma.cc/8X5S-YKKL].
35. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION
DIVIDES AND UNITES US 543–47, 541–42 (2010). 
36. Why should we consider it a matter of importance to guarantee freedom of
religion explicitly if religion is just a relatively inconsequential business of ceremonies 
and metaphysical speculation?  For the same reason that we should consider it desirable 
to guarantee individuals’ freedom to engage in all forms of consensual sexual activity.
Restrictions on consensual sex prevent people from engaging in harmless activities that 
produce pleasure.  Religion in the minimalist folk sense is, like sex, an innocuous source 
of enjoyment.  Like sex (given the availability of effective birth control), religion understood in
this way is inconsequential and harmless.  And where activities do no harm, the state ought 
not to impose any restriction on them and should, if necessary—in particular, if there is a 
history of suppression—explicitly recognize the right to engage in them without hindrance. 
40
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Protestants freedom of worship, until 168037 and the Catholic Relief Act, 
which repealed the last of the criminal laws aimed at Roman Catholics in
Great Britain, was only adopted in 182938—long after the First Amendment 
to the Constitution, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, was ratified
in 1791.
Given Jefferson’s understanding of religion and assumption that religious
belief and practice were fundamentally inconsequential, the guarantee of 
religious liberty is nothing more than a special case of the Harm Principle. 
Intuitively, individual liberty is justly restricted to prevent harm to others 
or activities which carry the real and present danger of harm.  Religion, 
understood as metaphysics and ceremony, is neither harmful nor dangerous 
and so should get the same treatment as other inconsequential, harmless 
practices.  Arguably, the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion 
rests upon Jefferson’s assumption that religious diversity and dissent are 
harmless. 
III. WALL OF SEPARATION OR FREEDOM OF “RELIGION”?
In the cases considered heretofore, actions, objects, and states of affairs
that otherwise would have been regarded as innocuous were taken to be 
objectionable because they were, in some sense, religious.  Groups renting 
school property were prohibited from engaging in certain activities solely
because they were religious activities. If they had done the very same overt 
actions as part of mock-up religious ceremonies for dramatic purposes 
there would have been no objection.  The Star of David at the Ohio Holocaust 
Memorial was regarded as objectionable because it was taken to be a religious
symbol.  If it had merely been a 6-pointed figure with no religious significance, 
there would be no objection.39 
The cases that interest Leiter, by contrast, concern actions, objects, and 
states of affairs that would have been regarded as objectionable—and 
legally prohibited—if they had not been religiously sanctioned.40 “Freedom
of religion” has been taken to require that in at least some such cases of
conflict individuals may be excused from legal obligations in virtue of 
their religious commitments: when Leiter asks, somewhat misleadingly,
why religion should be “tolerated,” he understands toleration as a matter 
37.  Toleration Act 1688, 1 W & M c. 18 (Eng.). 
38.  Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829, 10 Geo. 4 c. 7 (Eng.). 
39. See supra, notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
40. See LEITER, supra note 22, at 3. 
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of according special legal and moral treatment to religious practices broadly 
construed—as tolerating practices, and omissions, that would otherwise 
be intolerable. In light of such cases there appears to be a tension, at the
very least, between the wall of separation doctrine, insofar as it is understood 
to mandate religion-blindness, and the constitutional guarantee of religious 
freedom invoked to provide special accommodation for religious obligations. 
And that tension is inevitable if we define religion broadly, to embody 
practices and prohibitions beyond the inconsequentially metaphysical and 
innocuously ceremonial. 
Religion has traditionally enjoyed special treatment in the United States. 
Since the Civil War, Quakers, Mennonites, and members of other “peace 
churches” have routinely been excused from military service on religious 
grounds.41  During the latter decades of the 20th century, conscience 
clauses and accommodations for religious belief proliferated.  The 1972 
Supreme Court decision Wisconsin v. Yoder exempted Amish children 
from compulsory education past eighth grade because the Amish’s objection 
to further formal education was, the decision noted, “firmly grounded
in . . . religious concepts.”42  Soon after, in the wake of the Court’s ruling 
in Roe v. Wade, a number of states and the federal government enacted
conscience clauses excusing health care workers who had religiously 
based objections to abortion from participating in abortion services.43  In
addition, several states enacted “right of refusal laws” allowing pharmacists
to refuse to fill prescriptions for birth control drugs where filling such
prescriptions would be inconsistent with their religious beliefs.44  Last
year, the Supreme Court, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, ruled that requiring
family-owned corporations to pay for insurance coverage for contraception 
under the Affordable Care Act violated a federal law protecting religious
freedom.45  On a more cheerful note, the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act of 1978 exempted members of the Native American Church from 
prohibitions on “the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an 
Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes.”46
 41. See Özlem Altiok, Conscientious Objectors to War, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 389–92 (Gary L. Anderson & Kathryn G. Herr eds., 2007). 
42.  406 U.S. 205, 210, 234 (1972). 
43. See Adam Sonfield. Rights vs. Responsibilities: Professional Standards and
Provider Refusals, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2005, at 7, 7–9, https://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/3/gr080307.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKH8-NNZR]. 
44. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., PHARMACY REFUSALS 101, 1–4 (2011), http:// 
www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pharmacy_refusals_101_july_2011.pdf [https://perma.
cc/766D-ZH7H]. 
45.  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014). 
46. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996(a) (2012)).
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In these cases, the state was not religion-blind in its support of “religious
freedom.”  The Amish were excused from sending their children to high 
school because it was contrary to their religious convictions; parents who 
preferred to keep their adolescent children at home for other purposes
were not accommodated. Members of the Native American Church were
exempted from legal prohibitions on the use of peyote for religious purposes; 
Americans who wanted to use peyote for other reasons were not allowed
to do so. In light of such decisions, there seems to be an inconsistency
between the wall of separation doctrine, to the extent that, on one interpretation, 
it mandates religion-blindness and the constitutional support for the “free 
exercise of religion,” which in these cases took religion to license practices
that would otherwise be legally prohibited.  It is hard to see how we can 
have it both ways if we understand religion in the broad sense that Leiter 
proposes. 
If, however, we construe religion in the minimalist sense suggested, as
a mere matter of inconsequential metaphysical speculation and innocuous
ritual practices that do not conflict with laws or other serious secular 
obligations, then the guarantee of religious freedom is consistent with
religion-blindness—if that is what we understand to be mandated by the 
wall of separation.  Understood in this way, the guarantee of religious 
freedom simply affirms that religion should be treated in the same way as 
other harmless activities and preoccupations.  Arguably, the United States 
Constitution and other foundational legal documents mention religion 
precisely because, historically, it has not been treated in the same way as
other harmless practices.  Guarantees of religious freedom affirm that religion 
should not get special treatment. 
So long as religion is understood in the minimalist sense, as a matter of 
metaphysics and ritual, there is no inconsistency between religious freedom
and separation of church and state.  Metaphysical speculation and ordinary
religious ceremonies are harmless and so do not require any special 
accommodation.  On this account, the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of
religion simply asserts that religion should be treated in the same way as 
other harmless preoccupations and practices.
IV. RELIGION, CONSCIENCE, AND HARDSHIP EXEMPTIONS
If this is correct, then, while the state should not impose special restrictions
on religious activities, it should not exempt citizens from legal obligations
on religious grounds either.  For most Americans this is a hard saying. 
The provision of conscientious objector status to exempt members of
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peace churches from military service is a longstanding practice that most
Americans support.47  Other religious-based exemptions that have become 
customary in the U.S. and elsewhere are so inconsequential that rescinding 
them would seem pointlessly mean-spirited—and biased.  Sikhs wearing 
turbans are exempted from motorcycle helmet laws.48  There seems little 
reason not to excuse them: it is highly unlikely that such an exemption
would result in hordes of Sikh motorcyclists bashing their brains out and 
so imposing a burden on the healthcare system that would be passed on to 
others. Members of the Native American Church are exempt from
restrictions on the use of peyote.  Even if we regard restrictions on the use 
of some recreational drugs as desirable—which is highly controversial— 
it is unlikely that the consumption of peyote by a small minority of 
Americans in remote rural areas would promote a crack epidemic among
the urban underclass or have any other socially undesirable consequences.
Leiter argues, persuasively, that the rationale for accommodating religious
individuals in such cases is not their religious convictions per se but the
conscientious status of their commitments.  He writes the following: 
Kantian and utilitarian traditions of moral thought generate compelling support
for the conclusion that the state should protect liberty of conscience under the 
rubric of principled toleration.  But there appears to be no equally principled
argument that picks out distinctively religious conscience as an object of special
moral and legal solicitude.49 
If exemptions are warranted at all, he suggests, they are warranted on the
basis of conscience—which may or may not be religiously motivated.50 
Consequently, if we wish to grant such exemptions we should, to be fair, 
adopt either a Universal Exemptions approach, extending the conditions 
for exemption to all conscientious preferences, whether religiously motivated 
or not or else, Leiter’s preferred alternative, a No Exemption approach.51 
But is there compelling support for the conclusion that the state should
protect liberty of conscience?  Even if Leiter is correct in holding that
religious-based dissent should not be treated any differently from other
conscientious objections to legal obligations and prohibitions, it is not 
clear that conscience as such provides any persuasive moral reason for 
exemption from legal obligations.  Arguably we should understand
 47. See William D. Palmer, Time To Exorcise Another Ghost from the Vietnam War: 
Restructuring the In-service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L. REV. 179, 182 
(1993).
48. Associated Press, Sikhs Will Be Excused from Bike-Helmet Law, REG.-GUARD
(Eugene, Or.), Sept. 26, 1996, at 3D. 
49. LEITER, supra note 22, at 92. 
50. Id. at 98. 
51. See id. at 100–01. 
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accommodations for conscience—religiously motivated or otherwise—as
a species of hardship exemption, on all fours with accommodations for
medical, economic, and other kinds of hardship.
Whatever else “conscience” may be, it is at the very least an aggregate 
of preferences.  The Muslim prefers to wear a hijab, and the Sikh prefers
to carry a ceremonial dagger; the vegan prefers to abstain from animal
products, and the Mennonite prefers to abstain from military service. 
Characterizing such commitments as preferences is jarring because it
seems to trivialize them: surely they are not fleeting urges, superficial yens, 
or mere tastes—religious and ethical concerns, many assume, are deeper,
more stable, more intensely felt, and in some sense more important to a
person’s “identity”—in the loose and popular sense—than mere preferences. 
But this seems, as a matter of empirical fact, to be false. Some
nonconscientious preferences are neither trivial nor ephemeral.  More to 
the point, not all conscientious commitments are serious, intensely felt, or 
important to one’s “identity.”  I conscientiously take reusable tote bags to 
the supermarket when I go shopping.  When I forget to take them, I feel a 
twinge as I pack groceries into environmentally unfriendly single-use 
plastic bags. But no more than a twinge.  My conscientious commitment
to support environmental concerns, like most of my conscientious 
commitments, is not very important to me.  My failure to honor these 
commitments does not impose any serious hardship on me, and I doubt
that most people are any more conscientious than I am. 
Arguably, the purpose of exemptions and other accommodations is to 
avoid imposing undue hardship on individuals.  We recognize that compliance 
with some policies, practices, and regulations that does not impose a
serious burden on most individuals might represent a serious hardship for 
others. In some such cases, we regard it as only fair and decent to grant 
exemptions.  Rules forbidding animals in various public and semipublic 
facilities do not impose a significant burden on the general public.  But 
compliance would represent a serious hardship for handicapped individuals 
who depend on service dogs—so they are granted exemptions.  When 
conscription laws are in force, individuals whose military service would 
cause hardship to their families are given 3-A hardship deferments excusing 
them from service.52  Where the law requires that businesses accommodate
 52. Rod Powers, All About the Draft: The United States Selective Service System, 
ABOUT.COM, http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/draft2_3.htm [https://perma.cc/PEL5­
WQLE] (last updated Dec. 15, 2014). 
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handicapped employees, as mandated by the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, employers who can show that compliance would impose an “undue 
hardship” on the operation of their businesses are excused.53 
To the extent that hardship exemptions are legitimate, accommodations
for conscience may be warranted for some individuals for whom compliance 
with rules or regulations would impose a special hardship. For a seriously
committed pacifist, service in the military would impose such a hardship. 
In general, when compliance with a law imposes a serious hardship on
some individuals and granting exemptions does not impose any significant
burden on others or undermine the legitimate purposes of the state, it
seems reasonable to grant exemptions.  The decision to grant such exemptions
is a cost–benefit decision. When it comes to military service for example, 
we ask: How bad would it be for this individual, who is a committed
pacifist, to serve in the military?  Would military service impose an undue 
hardship on him or others?  How much do we need him and others like 
him—because, in fairness, they have to be treated in the same way—to 
serve in the military?  How many like him (in the relevant sense) are 
there?  If there are relatively few, it won’t hurt to excuse them all.  And if 
we can excuse some individuals from military service, we get a bigger
utility bang for our buck by excusing conscientious objectors than we 
would by selecting the lucky few at random by a lottery system.  We also
need to consider how expensive and time-consuming would it be to screen
conscientious objector applications.  Would the hardship to conscientiously 
dissident draftees under a lottery system outweigh the costs of maintaining 
a conscientious objector system?
This last concern is important: if the criteria for granting exemptions 
are ill-defined and difficult to establish, the machinery for adjudicating 
petitions for exemption could be prohibitively costly, cumbersome, and
unwieldy.  This is among the reasons why Leiter rejects as unworkable a 
Universal Exemption approach, according to which exemptions would be
extended to cover all conscientious commitments rather than just those 
that are religiously motivated.54  It is relatively unproblematic to determine
who qualifies for conscientious objector status according to traditional
religious-based criteria.  If a man is a Quaker or Mennonite, he gets a 1-O 
classification, which excuses him from military service; if he is a Jehovah’s 
Witness, he gets 1-A-O classification, which allows him to serve in noncombat
positions in the military.55  It is easy to determine who qualifies for
 53. What Is Considered an “Undue Hardship” for a Reasonable Accommodation?, 
ADA NAT’L NETWORK, http://adata.org/faq/what-considered-undue-hardship-reasonable­
accommodation [https://perma.cc/P84E-RJQ6] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
54. See LEITER, supra note 22, at 94–100. 
55. See Powers, supra note 52. 
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conscientious objector status on religious grounds: their bona fides can be 
determined by checking church records.  And that does not overly burden 
the system or require any complicated judgment calls.  If, however, the 
criteria are extended to all conscientious commitments, whether religious-
based or not, the decision procedure will be more complicated, and it may
be exceedingly difficult to determine whether the requisite claims of 
conscience are genuine.  A fortiori, extending the criteria further to cover 
all cases where military service or other legal requirements would impose 
a hardship, where that is construed broadly to include psychological as 
well as material hardship, will be complicated, cumbersome, time-consuming,
expensive, and ultimately haphazard at best. 
If the costs of adjudicating individually crafted claims of conscience
and other personal idiosyncrasies are prohibitive then, regrettably, they
cannot be accommodated, and so atypically conscientious individuals and
others will have to endure significant hardship.  However, regardless of 
whether it turns out to be cost-effective to recognize the claims of conscience
or not, our concern on this account should be solely with the likely
consequences of requiring individuals to comply with legal requirements, 
not the condition in virtue of which compliance would impose a hardship. 
It does not matter whether the condition that would make service in the 
military a hardship for an individual is moral conviction, responsibility 
for the care of young children, or flat feet.  In general, on this account, the
intent of such accommodations is not either to privilege religious conviction 
as such or to recognize claims of conscience but to provide exemptions 
from compliance with regulations that would impose undue hardship on
conscientious individuals. On this account, when considering such claims
as the basis for exemption from legal obligations or prohibitions, we 
should treat conscience in the way that we treat any other condition that
would make it unduly difficult for some individuals to comply with laws 
or regulations, such as economic hardship, physical disability, or psychological 
difficulty.
V. PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF RELIGION: A DEFENSE
I have argued that in maintaining the wall of separation between church
and state, first, we should assume a minimalist understanding of religion 
as metaphysics and ceremony and that we should treat religious symbols 
and ceremonies in the same way that we treat comparable secular symbols
and ceremonies.  This means that to the extent secular items are allowed
in public spaces and subsidized or funded with taxpayers’ money, comparable
 47
























   
 
    
   
   
  
 
religious products should be allowed and subsidized or funded.  If it is 
legal to display abstract sculptures on public land, it should be legal to
display crosses or other religious artifacts.  If school districts “subsidize” 
groups that meet for secular purposes by renting school facilities to them
at reduced rates, they should likewise “subsidize” congregations that conduct 
religious services in those facilities. So, in short, I suggest that we should 
be stingy—much stingier than we are now—in granting exemptions for 
conscience, but lavish in allowing and, indeed supporting, empty ceremonies 
and other public expressions of superficial religiosity. 
There are at least three objections that might be put to the latter policy. 
First, secularists suggest that public displays of religion, however superficial, 
“marginalize” members of religious minorities and nonreligious individuals.56 
Secondly, they argue that at least some such activities constitute 
“indoctrination” and promote not only the metaphysical views of religious
believers but also their moral, social, and political agendas.57  Finally, they
object to subsidizing or funding religious displays and ceremonies on the 
grounds that they do not benefit the public at large and so require taxpayers
to support programs and facilities that do not benefit them.58 
The first concern, regarding “marginalization,” is surely inflated.  Iris
Young in the classic account of marginalization in Five Faces of Oppression
characterizes it as the act of relegating or confining a group of people to a 
lower social standing or outer limit or edge of society, expelling “[a] whole 
category of people . . . from useful participation in social life.”  As a result, 
she writes, these groups are “subjected to severe material deprivation
[they don’t have access to basic resources] and even extermination [such
as genocide].”59  Are religious outsiders marginalized by public displays
of religion? Certainly practices that valorize exclusive groups, particularly if
they are socially recognized as prestigious, can make outsiders feel bad. 
The extensive display, ceremony, and prestige surrounding school sports
makes nerds and wimps feel bad.  Beauty pageants make fat women feel 
bad. Everybody is an outsider somewhere and has some reason to feel
bad. But being excluded and feeling bad are not marginalization—and it 
56. See, e.g., Sara Wicht, What Does the First Amendment Say About Displaying
Religious Symbols?, TEACHING TOLERANCE (June 2, 2014), http://www.tolerance.org/blog/ 
what-does-first-amendment-say-about-displaying-religious-sym [https://perma.cc/MB5J­
ZY49]. 
57. See, e.g., Allison Fick, Reports of Islamic Indoctrination Spread to Georgia
Public Schools, AM. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., http://aclj.org/religious-liberty/reports-of-islamic-
indoctrination-spread-to-georgia-public-schools [https://perma.cc/63QX-P385] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015). 
58. See, e.g., supra note 14, and accompanying text. 
59. IRIS MARION YOUNG, Five Faces of Oppression, in JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS 
OF DIFFERENCE 39, 53 (1990). 
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is hard to see what is gained by extending the language of “oppression” 
and “marginalization” to such relatively minor discomforts and disadvantages. 
Nerds, wimps, and fat women, whatever disadvantages they may face, are
not expelled from useful participation in social life or subjected to severe
material deprivation and are in no serious danger of extermination. 
Moreover, even given the visibility of religious, typically Christian, 
symbols and ceremonies in the U.S., members of religious minorities are 
not seriously disadvantaged. According to the Pew Research Center’s
2009 report on income distribution among U.S. religious groups, the religious 
groups with the highest income in the U.S. are Hindus and Jews.
Evangelicals, the largest and most visible religious group in the U.S., are 
in the bottom third of income distribution for religious groups.  Atheists, 
while they do not have income to compare to Hindus or Jews—in large 
part because they are, as a group, younger—do significantly better than
Catholics, Evangelicals, or mainline Protestants.  Twenty-eight percent of
atheists earn over $100,000 a year; the figures for Catholics, Evangelicals, 
and mainline Protestants are 19%, 13%, and 21% respectively.  As for the 
lowest earners, 31% of Catholics, 34% of Evangelicals, and 25% of mainline
Protestants earn less than $30,000 a year, while only 21% of atheists do.60 
Since the rise of the Religious Right in the 1980s, Evangelicalism, once 
invisible to most Americans, has come to be seen as the religious industry 
standard in the U.S. The public visibility of Evangelicals’ symbols and 
ceremonies—from Jesus billboards to televangelist TV to megachurch 
complexes—has not, however, translated into economic advantage for 
Evangelicals or “marginalized” religious minorities.  There is no serious
reason to predict that the presence of additional religious symbols or 
ceremonies in the public square would result in religious minorities or 
secularists being expelled from useful participation in social life and
subjected to severe material deprivation or the real and present danger of
extermination. 
Nevertheless, even if there is no reason to be concerned about exclusion,
secularists worry about inclusion—through indoctrination and recruitment.
They worry that public displays of religion will empower religious believers
to promote their theological doctrines, moral agendas and political programs.
And, indeed, some conservative Christians have precisely this in mind. 
60. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGION LANDSCAPE SURVEY:
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 58–61 (2008), http://www.pewforum.org/files/
2013/05/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B6U-EATH].
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They suggest that the abolition of school prayer in 1993 was a cause of 
moral decline and imagine that the public presence of religious symbols 
and practices would be efficacious in promoting faith, virtue, and good 
order.61 
The Protestant Reformers, particularly the spiritual forbearers of 
contemporary Evangelicals, knew better.  They opposed the public religiosity
that pervaded European Catholic culture—the crosses and shrines that 
littered the landscape and the extensive system of ceremonies, processions, 
and pilgrimages—because they recognized that these cheapened and
trivialized religion.  The Protestant Reformation was a protest against the 
reduction of religion to fetishes, formulaic prayer, trinkets, and empty
ceremonies.62  The remark about the religion of the 1950s attributed to
sociologist Peter Berger is apropos—children inoculated with such a
weakened form of religion were forever immune to the real thing.63  There
is, in any case, no reason to believe that the practice and display of superficial 
religion will inculcate the beliefs and commitments Evangelicals wish to
establish or promote their social or political agendas.  A religion-blind 
state can support the superficial public religion of fetishes and empty
ceremonies without worrying that that it might lead to any serious religious
commitment. 
Finally, secularists object to support for public displays of religion
because they hold that such displays benefit religionists at their expense. 
Taxpayers, however, fund a great many public projects from which they
themselves do not benefit.  Childless individuals pay for public education;
drivers subsidize public transportation; and philistines support the arts. 
All of us, as taxpayers, fund a wide range of public amenities that we 
ourselves do not use and public festivities in which we do not participate. 
Like parks, libraries, art exhibitions, public festivals, and farmers’ markets, 
religion is a public amenity.  That is obscured by the fact that most Americans,
including secular Americans, have unwittingly adopted the Evangelical
understanding of religion as a commitment to theological doctrine, a code 
of conduct and social agenda to which religious symbols and ceremonies
 61. See Laurie Goodstein, Diverse Group Debates Prayer in Public Schools, WASH.
POST (Apr. 6, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1994/04/06/diverse­
group-debates-prayer-in-public-schools/f19cb56f-70dd-4d2f-b5a4-3957b53f7175/ [https://
perma.cc/9T3G-6AR3].
62. See Martin E. Marty, The Protestant Heritage, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/major-reference-1354359 [https://perma.cc/U6WZ-86XA] 
(last updated Jan. 28, 2016). 
63. PETER L. BERGER, THE NOISE OF SOLEMN ASSEMBLIES 116 (1961) (“There occurs 
a process of religious inoculation, by which small doses of Christianoid concepts and
terminology are injected into consciousness.  By the time the process is completed, the
individual is effectively immunized against any real encounter with the Christian message.”).
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are merely peripheral—mechanisms for teaching, encouragement,
and proselytization.  Understood in this way, it is hard to see how religious
symbols and ceremonies could benefit people who do not want to be
taught, supported in their ideological commitments, or converted.  But this 
is an assumption that should be resisted: there is no reason why anyone
should accept the Evangelical account of what religion is. Historically, 
people have always enjoyed religious practices for their own sake: people 
without any religious interests attend choral Evensong and decorate their 
homes with statues of the Buddha and Byzantine icons.  There are no
doctrinal requirements for enjoying these good things, and no one is 
excluded. Religious objects and ceremonies are enjoyable and valuable 
as ends in themselves. 
So perhaps the solution to ongoing Culture Wars is to split the difference: 
to support unlimited superficial religion, including hilltop crosses,
Christmas crèches in parks, and formulaic prayers at civic celebrations, at
public meetings, and in schools, while emphatically rejecting all religious 
“values” and antiscientific myths.  “Freedom of religion” on this account 
is merely “freedom of worship”: freedom to hold whatever metaphysical 
beliefs one pleases and to participate in any innocuous ceremonies one 
enjoys—not license to “live according to one’s own faith” or to act 
consistently with the dogmatic precepts of one’s religion if they deviate 
from secular morality.  Religion on this account is acceptable to the extent,
and only to the extent, that it is consistent with secular ethics and science,
only insofar as it consists of no more than metaphysics and ritual: only if 
it neither picks our pockets nor breaks our legs. 
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64. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE , supra note 60, at 60. 
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